



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
US ARMY CHEMICAL MATERIALS AGENCY
ANNISTON CHEMICAL AGENT DISPOSAL FACILITY
3580 MORRISVILLE ROAD
ANNISTON, ALABAMA 36201

AMSCM-SEA

03 June 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Final Finding of No Significant Impact (FNSI) Explosive Destruction Technology (EDT)

PROPOSED INSTALLATION AND OPERATION
OF AN EXPLOSIVE DESTRUCTION TECHNOLOGY AT THE ANNISTON ARMY
DEPOT ANNISTON, ALABAMA FINDING OF NO SIGNIFICANT IMPACT

PROPOSED ACTION:

The remaining mission of the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) located at the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) is to safely dispose of the mustard-filled munitions and ton containers stockpiled at the ANAD. It is anticipated that the ANCDF may encounter deteriorated mustard-filled projectiles and mortars that will be armed, fused and not amenable to being processed at the ANCDF. An Environmental Assessment (EA) has been prepared to determine the best alternative to address the potential for deteriorated mustard-filled munitions. The proposed action is to implement an Explosive Destruction Technology (EDT) to facilitate safe and prompt destruction of deteriorated munitions that may be encountered during mustard munition processing at the ANCDF that cannot be disassembled.

The primary difference between an EDT and the existing three incinerators already operating at the ANCDF is the ability to process explosively configured munitions that are not suitable for disassembly (separation of the explosives, agent, and munitions bodies to the existing three incinerator systems). The proposed location is near Building 695, located in the north central part of ANAD. Once all the chemical agent munitions stored at ANAD are processed, the EDT could also be used for destruction of conventional munitions as a companion to ANAD's current Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) operations.

REASON FOR USING AN ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

The Army's implementing National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) regulations, 32 CFR 651, requires an EA be prepared whenever a project involves the construction and operation of a major new fixed facility. Disposal of the ANAD stockpile chemical munitions was addressed in previous Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) documentation as described below.

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SUBJECT: Final FNSI Explosive Destruction Technology (EDT)

SUMMARY OF NEPA DOCUMENTATION

In 1991, the US Army published a site-specific Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) assessing the destruction of lethal unitary chemical agent and munitions stored at the ANAD and concluded that on-site incineration was the preferred alternative. In 2003 and again in 2007, the Army prepared the ANCDF Review and Evaluation of Information for updating the 1991 FEIS. These documents evaluated all relevant, available new information to determine whether or not the 1991 FEIS needed to be supplemented. Determinations were made, both times, that supplementation of the FEIS was not required.

This EA has been prepared by the Army in compliance with NEPA and Army 32 CFR Part 651 to determine if significant impacts to the environment are likely to result from the implementation and operation of an EDT at ANAD. The generic environmental impact of operating an EDT was evaluated in the Transportable Treatment Systems for Non-Stockpile Chemical Warfare Material Programmatic FEIS (PFEIS) in 2001.

SUMMARY OF ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS

The ANAD was issued a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operating permit and the necessary Clean Air Act (CAA) Air Permits in June 1997 to operate the ANCDF. Operation of the ANCDF began in August 2003. Revisions and modifications have been made to both the RCRA and CAA permits since their initial approval in 1997. The RCRA permit was reissued in 2007 and revisions are still ongoing as required by applicable regulations. Both CAA and RCRA Permit applications will be prepared for the proposed action and issuance of the permits will be required prior to beginning construction of an EDT.

DETERMINATION

Disposal of mustard-filled munitions has been addressed in previous environmental reviews. The 1991 FEIS concluded that the ANAD stockpile of chemical munitions can be destroyed in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner and that the preferred alternative was onsite disposal. This was supported in 2003 and 2007 in the EIS updates. Prior to beginning disposal operations, the ANAD stockpile consisted of 661,529 individual munitions containing over 4.5 million pounds of agent. The EDT would dispose of munitions that are part of the ANAD stockpile but not suitable for disassembly at the ANCDF. The number of potential munitions that would be disposed of will be minimal compared to the remaining stockpile that will be processed at the ANCDF. In comparison to the impacts previously assessed, the proposed action would create no new environmental impacts.

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SUBJECT: Final FNSI Explosive Destruction Technology (EDT)

The continued use of the EDT after completion of the chemical agent disposal mission as a companion to OB/OD operations will enhance ANADs ability to dispose of some conventional munitions due to the EDT's pollution abatement equipment.

I have determined that in accordance with the Army's implementing NEPA regulations and in consideration of the EA prepared by subject-matter experts that no significant impacts would result from the proposed action. There is no significant increase of impact to the environment when compared to the current mission of the ANCDF. There is also no significant increase of impact to the environment for future use of an EDT for disposal of conventional munitions. The use of other alternatives and the no-action alternative were considered and determined to be unacceptable.



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Proposed Installation and Operation of an Explosive Destruction Technology at the Anniston Army Depot, Anniston, Alabama



April 2009

Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility Field Office
Chemical Materials Agency

Executive Summary

The remaining mission of the Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) located at the Anniston Army Depot (ANAD) is to safely dispose of the mustard-filled munitions and ton containers stockpiled at the ANAD. It is anticipated that the ANCDF may encounter deteriorated mustard-filled projectiles and mortars that will be armed, fused and not amenable to being processed at the ANCDF. This Environmental Assessment (EA) has been prepared to determine the best alternative to address the potential for deteriorated mustard-filled munitions. The proposed action is to implement an Explosive Destruction Technology (EDT) to facilitate safe and prompt destruction of deteriorated munitions that may be encountered during mustard munition processing at the ANCDF that cannot be disassembled.

The primary difference between an EDT and the existing three incinerators already operating at the ANCDF is the ability to process explosively configured munitions that are not suitable for disassembly (separation of the explosives, agent, and munitions bodies to the existing three incinerator systems). The proposed location is near Building 695, located in the north central part of ANAD. Once all the chemical agent munitions stored at ANAD are processed the EDT could also be used for destruction of conventional munitions as a companion to ANAD's current Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) operations.

There are two basic types of EDTs that could be used. The first is a system that uses donor charges to destroy the munition and the associated agent, such as the Controlled Detonation Chamber (CDC), the Detonation of Ammunition in Vacuum Integrated Chamber (DAVINCH) and the Explosive Destruction System (EDS). The second type uses indirect heat to raise the munition to above auto-ignition temperature to destroy the munition and the agent, such as the Static Detonation Chamber (SDC). EDTs can be a transportable unit or a fixed system constructed at the ANAD. Either type of system could be used for the intended purpose at the ANAD and each type has advantages and disadvantages.

The information and analyses presented in this EA indicate that no significant impacts would result from the proposed action. There is no significant increase of impact to the environment when compared to the current mission of the ANCDF. There is also no significant increase of impact to the environment the future use of an EDT for disposal of conventional munitions. The use of other alternatives and the no-action alternative were considered and determined to be unacceptable.

LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADMC - Anniston Defense Munitions Center
ADEM - Alabama Department of Environmental Management
ANAD - Anniston Army Depot
ANCDF - Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility
AR - Army Regulation
BACT - Best Available Control Technology
CAA - Clean Air Act
CDC - Controlled Detonation Chamber
CMA - Chemical Materials Agency
DAVINCH - Detonation of Ammunition in Vacuum Integrated Chamber
DDESB - Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board
DFS - Deactivation Furnace System
DOD - Department of Defense
DoDAC - DoD Ammunition Code
DRE - Destruction Removal Efficiency
EA - Environmental Assessment
EDS - Explosive Destruction System
EDT - Explosive Destruction Technology
FEIS - Final Environmental Impact Statement
FNSI - Finding of No Significant Impact
HD - blister agent distilled mustard, Bis(2-chloroethyl)sulfide ($C_2H_8Cl_2S$)
HT - 60 wt% blister agent-distilled mustard and 40 wt% agent T [Bis[2-(2-chloroethylthio)ethyl]ether]
HVAC - Heating, Ventilation and Air Conditioning
LIC - Liquid Incinerator
LPMD - Linear Projectile Mortar Disassembly
MDM - multipurpose demilitarization machines
MPF - Metal Parts Furnace
NEPA - National Environmental Policy Act
NEW - Net Explosive Weight
OB/OD - Open Burning/Open Detonation
OPCW - Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
PAS - Pollution Abatement System
PCBs - Polychlorinated Biphenyls
PFEIS - Programmatic Final Environmental Impact Statement
PMD - Projectile Mortar Disassembly
PPE - Personal Protective Equipment
RCRA - Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
SCC - Secondary Combustion Chamber
SDC - Static Detonation Chamber
SEL - Source Emission Limit
STEL - Short Term Exposure Limit
TOCDF - Tooele Chemical Disposal Facility
TSCA - Toxic Substance Control Act
TSDF - Treatment Storage and Disposal Facility

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Environmental Assessment Organization

This EA evaluates the environmental effects of the Army's proposed action: Installation and operation of an EDT at ANAD for the purpose of prompt and safe destruction of armed and fused mustard-filled munitions that cannot be safely destroyed at the ANCDF and for future destruction of conventional non-chemical munitions. This EA will provide information used in making the decision regarding the proposed action and other alternatives considered.

SECTION 1 PURPOSE AND NEED - This section summarizes the purpose of and the need for the proposed action and provides relevant background information.

SECTION 2 THE PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES CONSIDERED – This section describes the proposed action, the other alternatives considered and the no-action alternative.

SECTION 3 EXISTING ENVIRONMENT AND POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES - This section describes the existing environmental resources that could be affected by the proposed action, identifies potential environmental impacts of implementing the proposed action versus the no-action alternative.

SECTION 4 CONCLUSIONS – This section summarizes the significance of specific and cumulative impacts for the proposed action, of the alternatives and of the no-action alternative, and makes a recommendation to proceed with a Finding of No Significant Impact (FNSI).

SECTION 5 REFERENCES – This section provides bibliographic information for sources used in the preparation of this EA.

1 1.0 INTRODUCTION

2
3 1.1 PURPOSE OF AND NEED FOR THE PROPOSED ACTION

4
5 Under Title 14, Part B Section 1412 of Public Law 99-145 and in compliance with the Chemical
6 Weapons Convention (Senate Resolution 75, 105th Congress), the US Army Chemical Materials
7 Agency (CMA) has the responsibility for destroying the U.S. national defense stockpile of lethal
8 unitary chemical agents and munitions. The Army is currently destroying chemical munitions at
9 the ANCDF, located at the ANAD, in Anniston, Alabama. (See Figure 1) In August 2003, the
10 destruction of the ANAD inventory began in a specifically constructed facility at the ANCDF.
11 The destruction of GB and VX-filled munitions that were stored at ANAD has been completed
12 and the disposal of the mustard-filled munitions is scheduled to begin in June 2009. These
13 mustard-filled projectiles and mortars will be processed at the ANCDF using reverse
14 disassembly. Chemical agent drained from the munitions will be processed in the Liquid
15 Incinerator (LIC), the explosive material will be disposed of in the Deactivation Furnace System
16 (DFS) and the munitions bodies will be processed in the Metal Parts Furnace (MPF). During the
17 destruction of mustard munitions at a similar chemical agent disposal facility (the Tooele
18 Chemical Disposal Facility (TOCDF), located in Utah) there have been munitions found that
19 were deteriorated to a point where they could not be safely processed using reverse disassembly.
20 In anticipation that similar munitions will be found at the ANCDF, this EA has been prepared to
21 determine the best alternative to deal with these deteriorated mustard-filled munitions that are
22 armed, fused and unsafe to process at the ANCDF. The Army currently disposes of conventional
23 non-chemical agent munitions at the ANAD OB/OD Areas. The alternative selected could also
24 have a future use as a companion to the ANAD OB/OD operations for the disposal of some of
25 the conventional munitions.

26
27 The Army is required to destroy the entire stockpile of chemical munitions stored at ANAD for
28 several reasons:

- 29 - To protect human health and safety and the environment
- 30 - To comply with the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)
- 31 Convention
- 32 - To execute the requirements of the U.S. Congress and Public Law

33
34 The proposed Army action is to make available safe and cost-effective methods to dispose of the
35 mustard-filled chemical stockpile munitions currently stored at ANAD that cannot be reasonably
36 processed at the ANCDF due to deterioration.

37
38 1.2 BACKGROUND

39
40 1.2.1 NEPA DOCUMENTATION

41 In 1991, the US Army published a site-specific Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS)
42 assessing the destruction of lethal unitary chemical agent and munitions stored at the ANAD and
43 concluded that on-site incineration was the preferred alternative. In 2003 and again in 2007, the
44 Army prepared the ANCDF Review and Evaluation of Information for updating the 1991 FEIS.

1 This document evaluated all relevant, available new information to determine whether or not the
2 1991 FEIS needed to be supplemented. Supplementation of the EIS was not required at that time.

3
4 This EA has been prepared by the Army in compliance with National Environmental Policy Act
5 (NEPA) and the Army's implementing regulations (32 C.F.R Part 651) to determine if
6 significant impacts to the environment are likely to result from the implementation and operation
7 of an EDT at ANAD. The generic environmental impact of operating an EDT for the destruction
8 of non-stockpile chemical warfare materials has been evaluated in a Programmatic FEIS (PFEIS)
9 in 2001. The system described in the 2001 PFEIS is a transportable system that uses a donor
10 charge to detonate the munitions, followed by the use of a decontamination liquid to neutralize
11 the agent. A transportable system was proposed for the non-stockpile munitions because of the
12 potential large number of sites and the small numbers of munitions that could potentially be at
13 each site. A fixed facility at ANAD is more feasible due to the larger potential number of
14 munitions and the potential future use of the facility for destruction of some conventional
15 munitions stored at the ANAD.

16 17 1.2.2 ENVIRONMENTAL PERMITS

18 The ANAD was issued a Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) operating permit
19 and the necessary Clean Air Act (CAA) air permits in June 1997 to operate the ANCDF. A
20 Toxic Substance Control Act (TSCA) permit was also issued because of Polychlorinated
21 Biphenyls (PCBs) contained in the shipping and firing tubes of GB and VX agent-filled M-55
22 rockets. All of the rockets have been destroyed and ANCDF has successfully completed TSCA
23 closure. Revisions and modifications have been made to both the RCRA and CAA permits since
24 their initial approval in 1997. The RCRA permit was reissued in 2007 and revisions are still
25 ongoing. Construction of the ANCDF began in June 1997 and was completed in June 2001.
26 Operation of the ANCDF began in August 2003. The LIC, MPF and DFS surrogate and GB and
27 VX nerve agent trial burns reports have been approved by the Alabama Department of
28 Environmental Management (ADEM). Mustard agent trial burn plans are currently under review
29 by ADEM but are expected to be approved in May 2009.

30
31 ANAD and the Anniston Defense Munitions Center (ADMC) currently operate the OB/OD
32 Areas for conventional non-chemical munitions under interim status permit. A RCRA permit
33 application is currently being considered by ADEM and is expected to be approved in 2009.

34
35 Both CAA and RCRA permit applications will be prepared for the proposed action and issuance
36 of the permits will be required prior to beginning construction of an EDT.

37
38 Approval from the Department of Defense Explosive Safety Board (DDESB) will be required.

39 40 1.3. MUNITIONS

41 42 1.3.1 MUSTARD-FILLED MUNITIONS STORED AT ANAD

43 The chemical munitions currently stored at ANAD consist of HT-filled 4.2 inch Mortars (M2),
44 HD-filled 4.2-inch Mortars (M2A1), HD-filled 105-mm Projectiles (M60), HD-filled

1 155-mm Projectiles (M110). ANAD also stores HD-filled ton containers which will not be
2 considered for disposal in the proposed EDT. The mortars and projectiles contain explosive
3 materials. Table 1 is a description of chemical agent munitions that may be disposed of in an
4 EDT. Figures 2-4 include a graphic depiction of these munitions.

6 1.3.2. CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS CURRENTLY BEING DISPOSED AT THE ANAD 7 OB/OD AREAS

9 An EDT could also be utilized to destroy conventional munitions and components and could be
10 used to supplement disposal operations at the ANAD OB/OD Areas. Table 2, though not all
11 inclusive, is a listing of items identified as possible candidates for disposal in an EDT. The safe
12 net explosive weight limit of the particular EDT chosen would never be exceeded if the system is
13 used for disposal of conventional munitions and components.

15 2.0 PROPOSED ACTION AND ALTERNATIVES

16 The Proposed Action is described in Section 2.1. The No Action Alternative is discussed in
17 Section 2.2. Alternatives to the Proposed Action are discussed in Section 2.3. The Army has
18 determined that these other alternatives considered would not meet the mission requirements or
19 could not be feasibly implemented at this time. Section 2.4 describes continued use of the EDT
20 as a companion to the ANAD OB/OD for the disposal of some conventional munitions at the
21 completion of the chemical agent disposal mission.

23 2.1 PROPOSED ACTION: To Install and Operate an EDT at ANAD.

25 In the near future, the Army will begin processing mustard-filled munitions. Based on the
26 number of deteriorated munitions found at TOCDF coupled with information from the ANCDF
27 stockpile surveillance program, it is estimated that there will be approximately 2,500 to 5,000
28 munitions found that cannot be disassembled and processed using existing equipment at the
29 ANCDF. The proposed action is to implement an EDT to facilitate safe and prompt destruction
30 of deteriorated munitions that may be encountered during mustard munition processing at the
31 ANCDF that cannot be disassembled. The implementation of an EDT at ANAD is intended to
32 meet the need for a mechanism for prompt destruction of the deteriorated mustard munitions that
33 are armed, fused or otherwise unsafe. An EDT could also be used after completion of the
34 destruction of the ANAD mustard stockpile for disposal of conventional munitions.

36 2.1.1 THE PROPOSED ACTION AND ASSOCIATED EQUIPMENT

38 This section describes the installation and operation of an EDT at ANAD. This section also
39 describes the waste streams that would be produced during the use of an EDT. Section 2.3
40 discusses other alternatives considered by the Army.

42 The proposed action is to install and operate an EDT at ANAD. The primary difference between
43 an EDT and the existing three incinerators already operating at ANAD's ANCDF is the ability to
44 process explosively configured munitions that are not suitable for disassembly (separation of the

1 explosives, agent, and munitions bodies to the existing three incinerator systems). The proposed
2 location is near ANAD Building 695, located in the north central part of ANAD.

3
4 There are two basic types of EDTs that could be used. The first is a system that uses donor
5 charges to destroy the munition and the associated agent, such as the Controlled Detonation
6 Chamber (CDC), the Detonation of Ammunition in Vacuum Integrated Chamber (DAVINCH)
7 and the Explosive Destruction System (EDS). The second type uses indirect heat to raise the
8 munition to above auto-ignition temperature to destroy the munition and the agent, such as the
9 Static Detonation Chamber (SDC). These types of units are described below. EDTs can be a
10 transportable unit or a fixed system constructed at the ANAD. Either type of system could be
11 used for the intended purpose at the ANAD and each type has advantages and disadvantages.

12
13 Both CAA and RCRA permit applications will be prepared for the proposed action and issuance
14 of the permits will be required prior to beginning construction of an EDT. Regardless of the type
15 of system selected, an EDT will be required to achieve a destruction and removal efficiency of
16 99.9999% for mustard agent. These permits will also contain emissions limits for other
17 hazardous constituents.

18 19 2.1.1. EDTs That Use a Donor Charge

20 21 2.1.1.1 Controlled Detonation Chamber (CDC)

22
23 The CDC is a cold detonation chamber technology that employs donor charges in the form of
24 sheet explosives which are manually prepared and applied by operators. The munition is placed
25 into the detonation chamber using a jib crane. The CDC is configured with a manual firing
26 system with positive feedback continuity checks, confirming the system is ready for detonation.
27 Additional oxygen is added to the chamber just prior to the detonation to aid in the destruction
28 process. An expansion chamber downstream of the detonation chamber is designed to control
29 the sudden increase in pressure from the detonation. The system is designed with two flow
30 control valves between the expansion tank and the off-gas system. These valves can be closed
31 which allows for detonation gases to be held in the expansion tank and tested. The off gas
32 treatment system removes particulates, organics and metals. The system achieves a Destruction
33 Removal Efficiency (DRE) of > 99.9999% for mustard.

34
35 The CDC is considered a mobile unit and has DDESB approval for the destruction of munitions
36 containing high-explosive, smoke, riot control agents, incendiary fills, and propellants.

37
38 Figure 5 is a diagram of the CDC unit that includes identification of all critical subsystems.
39 This system is housed in a structure with a redundant filtration system to provide secondary
40 vapor containment.

41
42 The CDC has been extensively tested and evaluated by the Department of Defense (DOD)
43 organizations with an ongoing chemical demilitarization mission. There is considerable
44 documentation available that is related not only to the viability of the system, but also to the
45 safety of the system.

1
2 2.1.1.2 Detonation of Ammunition in Vacuum Integrated Chamber (DAVINCH)
3

4 The DAVINCH is a cold detonation chamber. Munitions placed in the DAVINCH vessel are
5 detonated in a near vacuum using a donor explosive charge to open the munitions and access the
6 chemical agent. The agent is destroyed as a result of the high temperature and pressure
7 generated by the shock wave, followed by high-speed cavitation and then a fireball. Figure 6
8 presents main components of the DAVINCH system. The main two structural elements of the
9 DAVINCH unit are the outer chamber and the inner chamber. The outer chamber is designed as
10 a pressure boundary to withstand detonation pressure. It is made of multiple-layered, cylindrical
11 shell, steel structure. The multiple layers act as crack arrestors and do not permit cracks in the
12 innermost layer to propagate into the outer layers, due to the discontinuity of the structure. The
13 inner chamber is designed to resist the impulsive load and to protect the outer chamber from
14 associated munition fragments. The inner chamber does eventually need to be replaced, but
15 because this inner vessel is easily removed and examined, it also can be thought of as a
16 "sacrificial barrier."
17

18 Munitions are loaded in the chamber via a moving deck with a robotic arm. The donor charge is
19 detonated by remote control after a pre-detonation procedure which results in the destruction of
20 the munitions. The detonation product gas is kept under negative pressure in the detonation
21 chamber throughout the process, excluding the positive pressure which lasts approximately one
22 minute after detonation. The negative pressure prevents unexpected leakage of any gases, even
23 though no detectable agent is normally found in the off-gas after detonation. The detonation
24 product gas is extracted by the vacuum pump through an off-gas pre-filter and sent to the off-gas
25 treatment system. A predetermined amount of oxygen is mixed with the off-gas at the Cold-
26 Plasma Oxidizer where hydrogen and carbon monoxide are oxidized.
27

28 The DAVINCH system incorporates a hold, test and release capability. The gas is monitored at
29 the outlet of the oxidizer to ensure the gas contains no chemical agent and then passes through
30 the off-gas retention tank where it is held and tested to confirm agent is below the Short Term
31 Exposure Limit (STEL) before the gas is discharged. After the chemical agent level is
32 confirmed, the gas is discharged by the off-gas blower through an activated carbon filter system.
33 From operational experience and surrogate testing, residual chemical agents are non-detectable
34 in detonation off-gases and are below the STEL. The DRE for the detonation product gas prior
35 to any treatment has been determined to be >99.9999% on VX-simulant.
36

37 2.1.1.3 The Explosive Destruction System (EDS)
38

39 The primary component of the EDS is a stainless steel vessel. The system is operated by placing
40 the munition in the containment vessel with explosive charges attached. Detonation of the
41 charge destroys the explosive component of the munition and opens its outer casing (munition
42 body) to release the chemical fill under total containment (i.e. no release to the environment).
43 Neutralizing reagents are then pumped into the sealed containment vessel to chemically react
44 with the chemical fill and contaminated components of the munitions. After allowing the
45 mixture of chemicals to react, a sample is drawn through the vessel door to verify that the fill has

1 been neutralized. After verification, the neutralent is drained into drums for shipment to a
2 permitted, commercial Treatment Storage and Disposal Facility (TSDF). The pressure generated
3 inside the vessel during the detonation and treatment is vented through a carbon filter, which
4 removes any residual reagents and other chemicals from the air stream. Figure 7 shows the
5 major components of the EDS. The EDS is typically a portable system.

6 7 2.1.2 Indirect Fired EDTs

8 9 2.1.2.1 The Static Detonation Chamber (SDC)

10
11 The indirect fired unit referred to as the Static Detonation Chamber (SDC) is equipped with a
12 secondary combustion chamber (SCC) and pollution abatement system (PAS). The system is
13 interlocked so it is never open to the outside during operations. The detonation chamber is
14 heated above the auto-ignition temperature of all known explosives and propellants, ensuring
15 complete destruction of both the explosive and agent components in one step without the need to
16 dismantle unstable munitions. The flue gas from the chamber passes through the SCC to assure
17 agent destruction. The munition bodies are held in the chamber a sufficient amount of time to
18 assure that they are free from explosive and/or agent and are suitable for being disposed as scrap
19 metal. No counter charges are required and munitions will need no preparation prior to disposal.
20 The ability to eliminate the need for counter charges and to minimize the handling requirements
21 for these unstable munitions provides significant safety enhancements to the workforce. The
22 primary components of the SDC are indicated in Figure 8.

23
24 The PAS would be comprised of a quench tower, scrubber system, activated carbon and a
25 baghouse prior to exhausting through the stack. This type system has successfully demonstrated
26 a DRE greater than 99.9999% for mustard and has been used and is still in service at many
27 international locations.

28 29 2.1.3 Installation of an EDT

30
31 Regardless of the type of EDT selected, the footprint will be less than five acres. Any system
32 would be installed in accordance with manufacturer's recommendations and each component
33 would be pre-assembled and tested prior to delivery. Electrical power for the site would be
34 provided via the ANAD distribution system. Air monitoring would be housed in a shelter to
35 protect workers and the equipment from the weather and to provide a suitable operating
36 environment. Operations would be conducted from a command post equipped with the
37 necessary computers, communications equipment and controls to enable operations and data
38 collection functions.

39 40 2.1.4 Operation of an EDT

41
42 After preparation of the site and installation of an EDT, the system would undergo systemization
43 and pre-operational verifications to ensure that the equipment, procedures, and crew are ready to
44 begin destroying munitions safely should they be encountered. A Demonstration Test will likely
45 be required by the State of Alabama to assure that emissions are within permitted limits.

1
2 As munitions are identified that cannot be reverse disassembled, they will either be brought
3 directly to an EDT for disposal or returned to permitted storage, awaiting disposal at an EDT.
4

5 The EDT is expected to be in operation by 2010. Completion of the chemical agent disposal
6 mission is expected to be completed before April 20, 2012. At the completion of the chemical
7 munitions disposal mission the EDT will be closed in accordance with the ANCDF closure plan
8 and ADEM requirements. At that time the EDT could be available for use by ANAD as a
9 companion to OB/OD operations.
10

11 2.1.5 Waste Management 12

13 Regardless of the type of EDT chosen, all wastes will be disposed of in accordance with
14 applicable solid and hazardous waste regulations and permit requirements. The munitions would
15 be required to be treated to a chemical agent free level allowing the scrap metal and shell
16 fragments to be sent to a smelter for recycling. Agent related secondary waste such as used
17 carbon, Heating Ventilation and Air Condition (HVAC) filters, Personal Protective Equipment
18 (PPE) and spent decontamination solution could be disposed of at the ANCDF in accordance
19 with the ANCDF Waste Analysis Plan. Two of the EDTs discussed in this document would
20 generate agent free liquid process waste that would be disposed of in accordance with solid and
21 hazardous waste regulations.
22

23 2.1.6 Air Emissions 24

25 The system selected will be required to achieve DRE of 99.9999%. The EDT selected must be
26 able to satisfy applicable state emission requirements. These requirements include control of
27 agent emissions to <0.2 Source Emission Limit (SEL.) The system must incorporate Best
28 Available Control Technology (BACT) to control emissions of agent, particulate matter, metals
29 and organic compounds. The system must also comply with all RCRA requirements including
30 requirement to not pose an unacceptable human health carcinogenic risk, considering cumulative
31 affects from the ANCDF and ANAD/ADMC OB/OD operations.
32

33 2.2 THE NO ACTION ALTERNATIVE: Continued Storage of the Deteriorated Mustard 34 Munitions at ANAD 35

36 The no-action alternative would be to not place an EDT at the ANAD and to continue to store the
37 munitions that could not be processed at the ANCDF at the ANAD. The site modification
38 required to support an EDT would not be performed. If munitions were encountered that could
39 not be safely processed at the ANCDF, they would be returned to storage and the risk of
40 unintended explosion and release of agent would continue. Under this alternative, the unsafe
41 munitions would continue to be monitored for leaks and other signs of deterioration. If leaks
42 were detected during routine monitoring and inspection, the leaking munition would be
43 repackaged to contain the leak and allow continued storage. Continued maintenance,
44 surveillance, and monitoring activities would consume financial and manpower resources for as
45 long as the unstable munition remained in storage. While these munitions remain in storage, the

1 igloos cannot be used for other purposes. Additionally, continued storage of chemical munitions
2 would not allow the Army to meet United States treaty obligations under the Chemical Weapons
3 Convention. For the reasons state above this alternative was not further evaluated or preferred.
4

5 2.3 ALTERNATIVES TO THE PROPOSED ACTION

6 7 2.3.1 MANUAL DISASSESSMBLY AND PROCESSING AT THE ANCDF

8
9 The ANCDF uses reverse disassembly to break down chemical munitions prior to disposal in
10 three separate incinerator systems. The explosive components are removed using a
11 projectile/mortar disassembly machine (PMD) in an explosive containment room. Explosive
12 components may also be removed by Linear PMD, located at ANAD building 695. Agent is
13 drained from the munitions using the multipurpose demilitarization machines (MDM). The
14 PMD and MDM are remotely operated from a central control room. The explosive components
15 are removed from the munitions and fed to the DFS, which is a rotary kiln designed to deactivate
16 energetics. The liquid chemical agent is drained from the munition and fed to the LIC designed
17 to destroy liquid chemical agents. The munition body containing residual chemical agent is fed
18 to the MPF to thermally decontaminate, producing scrap metal. None of the three existing
19 furnaces are designed to process an intact, explosively configured mustard-filled munition.
20

21 Manual disassembly of the deteriorated munitions was considered. Though ANCDF employees
22 routinely perform maintenance of equipment contaminated with chemical agent while wearing
23 protective equipment to prevent agent exposure, manual disassembly is considered dangerous for
24 the ANCDF workforce due to the explosive components of the munition. Thus, this alternative
25 was not further evaluated or preferred.
26

27 2.3.2 OFFSITE DISPOSAL ALTERNATIVE

28
29 Commercial facilities are available that can dispose of explosive materials, but there are none
30 that are also permitted to dispose of military chemical agents. The movement of mustard-filled
31 munitions to an EDT at another location would be an option, but public law currently restricts
32 the movement of stockpile chemical munitions. Due to these restrictions this alternative was not
33 further evaluated or preferred.
34

35 2.3.3 OPEN BURNING/OPEN DETONATION OF MUSTARD MUNITIONS

36
37 Conventional munitions are often destroyed using open burning or open detonation. This practice
38 is not considered appropriate for chemical munitions due to the potential release of chemical
39 agent into the environment. In addition, open detonation of chemical munitions is not permitted
40 by ADEM.
41
42
43
44
45

1 2.4 CONTINUED USE OF THE EDT FOR DISPOSAL OF CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS

2
3 2.4.1 PROCESS AT THE ANAD OB/OD AREAS

4
5 The waste management activities conducted at the ANAD OB/OD Areas is thermal treatment of
6 conventional waste military munitions and related energetic wastes. OB operations are
7 completed within burn pans. OD operation is typically accomplished below ground with a small
8 fraction of surface detonations. The OB/OD Areas currently operate under RCRA Interim
9 Status. Permitting activities are ongoing and a RCRA permit is expected prior to the end of
10 Calendar Year 2009. A health risk assessment required by RCRA indicates the OB/OD
11 operations do not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment even when
12 cumulatively added to emissions from the ANCDF. The EDT can be used as a companion to
13 OB/OD operations once the chemical munitions disposal mission is completed and will be
14 required to meet permitted emissions limits.
15

16 3.0 EXISTING ENVIRONMENT AND POTENTIAL ENVIRONMENTAL CONSEQUENCES

17
18 This section describes the existing environment that could be affected by the proposed action and
19 the potential environmental impact that could occur as a result of the proposed action and the no-
20 action alternative. Disposal of mustard-filled munitions has been addressed in previous
21 environmental reviews (Section 1.2.1). The 1991 FEIS concluded that the ANAD stockpile of
22 chemical munitions can be destroyed in a safe and environmentally acceptable manner and that
23 the preferred alternative is onsite disposal. This was supported in 2003 and 2007 in the EIS
24 updates. Prior to beginning disposal operations, the ANAD stockpile consisted of 661,529
25 individual munitions containing over 4.5 million pounds of agent. The EDT will dispose of less
26 than one percent of the total munitions destroyed at the ANCDF. In comparison to the impacts
27 previously assessed, the proposed action would create no new environmental impacts.
28

29 The continued use of the EDT after completion of the chemical agent disposal mission as a
30 companion to OB/OD operations will enhance ANADs ability to dispose of some conventional
31 munitions due to the EDT's pollution abatement equipment.
32

33 3.1 LAND USE

34
35 3.1.1 Affected Environment

36
37 ANAD is located in Calhoun County, Alabama, approximately 10 miles west of the city of
38 Anniston. The installation covers an area of approximately 15,246 acres and is a government
39 owned, government operated installation which also has government contractor as tenants. The
40 ANCDF is a government owned contractor operated tenant organization of the ANAD and is
41 located in the north central portion of ANAD. The proposed EDT will be located near ANAD
42 Building 695 (The Reconfiguration Building), just south of the ANCDF. Figure 9 shows the
43 location of the ANAD relative to the City of Anniston. The ANCDF, the ANAD
44 Reconfiguration Building and the ANAD OB/OD Areas are indicated on Figure 1.
45

1 3.1.2 Impacts of the Proposed Action Alternative

2
3 The site is currently cleared, leveled and covered with gravel and ready for industrial use.
4 Excavation for installation of utilities would be minimal. The implementation of an EDT at this
5 location will have no significant land use impacts.

6
7 3.1.3 Impacts of the No-action Alternative

8
9 Under the no-action alternative, the site would remain ready for industrial use.

10
11 The ANAD currently disposes of conventional munitions using OB/OD Areas, therefore there
12 would be no additional impact to land use if the conventional munitions are disposed of in an
13 EDT.

14
15 3.2 AIR QUALITY

16
17 3.2.1 Impacts of the Proposed Action Alternative

18
19 Air emissions from site preparation is anticipated to be minimal because the area is already an
20 industrial site and the land disturbance is anticipated to be minimal. There should be negligible
21 generation of dust from equipment installation activities. The emissions from vehicles would be
22 incidental, short-term and small.

23
24 Regardless of the EDT selected, emissions from processing the mustard-filled munitions will be
25 required to meet both CAA and RCRA permit limits. A risk assessment will be conducted to
26 verify that cumulative effects from operation of the EDT, the ANAD OB/OD Operations and the
27 ANCDF will not pose an unacceptable risk to human health or the environment.

28
29 Emissions from vehicles transporting munitions to an EDT are expected to be incidental and
30 small.

31
32
33 3.2.2 Impacts of the No-action Alternative

34
35 During continued storage of mustard-filled munitions it would be expected that munitions may
36 occasionally leak, just as they occasionally leak during current storage activities. Leaks would
37 be contained and carbon ventilation system added to the storage igloo to prevent agent migration
38 to the atmosphere, so there would be no additional air quality impacts expected.

39
40 The future use of an EDT for disposal of some conventional munitions could have positive
41 impact on emissions.

1 3.3 WATER RESOURCES

2
3 3.3.1 Impacts of the Proposed Action Alternative

4
5 Regardless of the EDT selected, use of ANAD groundwater will not occur. All water used will
6 be from municipal source that currently supplies the ANCDF and ANAD. Municipal water
7 supply available is expected to be adequate for operation of any of the EDTs selected. Use of
8 groundwater is not allowed on ANAD per the Installation Land Use Control. Therefore there
9 will be no impact to groundwater. Regardless of the type of EDT selected, sanitary wastewater
10 from restrooms, etc. will be produced and will be disposed of via the ANAD sewage treatment
11 plant. The ANAD sewage treatment plant has adequate capacity to accommodate expected
12 volume of sanitary wastewater. If the SDC is selected, water will be used for the operation of the
13 PAS and PAS brine will be produced. The EDS will produce spent decontamination solution.
14 Liquid wastes would be disposed of either offsite or at the ANCDF in accordance with
15 applicable solid and hazardous waste regulations. Wastewater would not be discharged to the
16 surface, so there will be a no impact to surface water.

17
18 3.3.2 Impacts of the No-action Alternative

19
20 Continued storage of mustard munitions is not expected to impact groundwater or surface water.

21
22 3.4 ECOLOGICAL RESOURCES

23
24 3.4.1 Impacts of the Proposed Alternative

25
26 The site for an EDT is already cleared for industrial usage so the site encompasses no habitat for
27 endangered or threatened plants or animals. The closest threatened species is the Tennessee
28 Yellow Eyed Grass located at the OB Area approximately 1.5 miles away. There are no
29 wetlands or floodplains present in the immediate area. (Basinger, 2009) There will be no adverse
30 effects on any wetlands, aquatic resources, or threatened and endangered species.

31
32 In 2004, a biological assessment for operations of the ANCDF was prepared and submitted to the
33 US Fish and Wildlife Service for concurrence. In addition, an Integrated Natural Resource
34 Management Plan for ANAD was prepared, coordinated with the US Fish and Wildlife Service
35 and signed into effect on Jan 22, 2007. While nine threatened or endangered species may occur
36 within six miles of the ANCDF, none of these species are located closer than approximately two
37 miles from the ANCDF site itself. The 2004 biological assessment concluded that no adverse
38 impacts are likely to occur to threatened or endangered species during the operational lifetime of
39 the ANCDF. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service concurred with the Army's conclusions. Since
40 an EDT will process such a small number of munitions that would have been processed at the
41 ANCDF, and the proposed location is within 0.5 miles of the ANCDF, it is concluded that the
42 disposal of these munitions in an EDT instead of the ANCDF would have a negligible effect on
43 threatened or endangered species. Continued use of an EDT for conventional munitions would
44 also have a negligible affect on threatened or endangered species.

1 3.4.2 Impacts of the No Action Alternative

2
3 Continued storage of mustard munitions will not affect ecological resources.

4
5 3.5 SOCIOECONOMIC RESOURCES

6
7 3.5.1 Impacts of the Proposed Action.

8
9 EDT staff will be less than 20 employees for an estimate of 2 years for disposal of the mustard
10 munitions that cannot be processed at the ANCDF. This number is insignificant compared to the
11 approximately 800 currently employed at the ANCDF. The use of an EDT for processing the
12 mustard munitions would not contribute to significant impact of socioeconomic resources. If the
13 unit is used for disposal of conventional munitions after completion of the mission to dispose of
14 the mustard munitions, a staff of less than 20 would be employed and would also be considered
15 minimal. Therefore, there would be no significant impact of socioeconomic resources for
16 continued use of an EDT for conventional munition disposal.

17
18 3.5.2 Impacts of the No Action Alternative

19
20 When the last chemical agent munition stored at ANAD is destroyed, the workers who monitor
21 and maintain the stockpile will no longer be needed. Continued storage would require a part of
22 that workforce to be kept to maintain and monitor the remaining chemical munitions. Continued
23 storage would also require that staff, equipment and procedures be maintained to respond to
24 Chemical Agent Accidents and Incidents. An estimated 150 personnel would have to be retained
25 until the mustard munition processing was completed (John Harsch, ANCA).

26
27 3.6 CULTURAL, ARCHAEOLOGICAL AND HISTORIC RESOURCES

28
29 3.6.1. Impacts of the Proposed Alternative

30
31 Because all activities associated with an EDT would occur within areas that are already
32 considered an industrial site, there is no potential for the action to disturb or effect cultural,
33 archaeological or historic resources. There are no archeological sites at ANAD. The Ammunition
34 Limited Area where the unit will be located is considered an historic district, but a memorandum
35 of understanding was issued by the State Historic Preservation Office that allows the facility to
36 conduct mission required operations. (Brockington & Associates 2004)

37
38 3.6.2. Impacts of the No action Alternative

39
40 If the munitions are allowed to remain in storage, there will be no impact on cultural resources.

41
42 If an EDT is not used for the disposal of conventional munitions the munitions would continue to
43 be disposed of at the ANAD OB/OD Areas. There would be no impact to cultural resources.

1 3.7 MINORITY AND LOW-INCOME POPULATIONS

2
3 3.7.1 Impacts of the Proposed Alternative

4
5 Environmental justice populations were considered in the decision to dispose of chemical
6 munitions at the ANCDF. At that time low income and minority populations were not considered
7 to be disproportionately impacted. The disposal of some mustard-filled munitions using an EDT
8 instead of disposal at the ANCDF will still result in the disposal of chemical munitions at the
9 ANCDF and should not change the impact to surrounding populations.

10
11 Continued use of an EDT for disposal of conventional munitions would not change the impact on
12 low income and minority populations, because conventional munitions are already being
13 disposed of in the ANAD OB/OD Areas.

14
15 3.7.2 Impacts of the No Action Alternative

16
17 It is unlikely that there would be any offpost impact from continued storage of mustard-filled
18 munitions.

19
20 3.8 WASTE MANAGEMENT ISSUES

21
22 3.8.1. Impacts of the Proposed Alternative

23
24 The wastes produced by an EDT are similar in nature and quantity as those produced at the
25 ANCDF. Wastes will be disposed of in accordance with the ANCDF Waste Analysis Plan and
26 applicable solid waste and hazardous waste regulations.

27
28 Use of an EDT for disposal of conventional munitions would not significantly alter the waste
29 produced during OB/OD Operations.

30
31 3.8.2. Impacts of the No Action Alternative

32
33 Continued storage of the mustard munitions would only defer production of the wastes produced
34 from disposal. Waste associated with monitoring and maintenance of stored munitions will
35 continue to be produced.

36
37 3.9 HUMAN HEALTH AND SAFETY

38
39 3.9.1. Impacts of the Proposed Alternative

40
41 Impacts of the installation of an EDT would be similar to those of any small-scale industrial
42 construction project and would not be considered significant or unique.

43
44 If the mustard munitions could not be disassembled using equipment at the ANCDF, manual
45 disassembly of the munitions would be required before processing at the ANCDF. Manual

1 disassembly could subject employees to dangers of explosion. Munitions could be fed without
2 manual disassembly into an EDT, resulting in improved safety for the workforce. Though EDTs
3 that use donor charges would require application of explosive material, this operation is
4 considered safer than manual disassembly of agent-filled munitions. DDESB permits will be
5 required for operation of an EDT.

6
7 There is no significant difference in the worker safety from disposal of conventional munitions in
8 an EDT compared to OB/OD operations. Both require handling of the munitions and some EDTs
9 require use of a donor charges.

10 11 3.9.2. Impacts of the No Action Alternative

12
13 Continued storage of mustard-filled munitions could result in personnel exposure to chemical
14 agent in case of a leak. Munitions have been safely stored at ANAD since the 1960's, so the
15 impact of continued storage of mustard-filled munitions to the workforce is considered to be
16 relatively small.

17 18 4.0 CONCLUSIONS

19
20 The information and analyses presented in this EA indicate that no significant impacts would
21 result from the proposed action as described in section 2.1. There is no significant increase of
22 impact to the environment when compared to the current mission of the ANCDF.

23
24 The use of other alternatives as described in section 2.3 were considered unacceptable.

25
26 Evaluation of the no-action alternative, continuing to store the problematic mustard-filled
27 munitions, could result in a significant impact. This alternative would prevent the Army from
28 completing the destruction of stockpile chemical munitions stored at ANAD, resulting in missing
29 an OPCW Convention deadline. It would also continue to represent an extremely minor general
30 population risk and the risk to the storage workforce.

31
32 Based on the above consideration and the absence of significant adverse environmental impacts
33 of the proposed action, the Army concludes that the most desirable course of action would be to
34 install and operate an EDT at ANAD and use it to destroy any mustard-filled munitions that can
35 not be safely disassembled and processed at the ANCDF as well as for conventional munitions
36 that are currently disposed of at the ANAD OB/OD Areas. This action would not cause any
37 significant impacts. A draft Finding of No Significant Impact (FNSI) indicating this conclusion
38 will be prepared and published for public comment.

1 5.0 REFERENCES

2
3 May 1991, *Disposal of Chemical Agents and Munitions Stored at Anniston Army Depot,*
4 *Anniston, Alabama, Final Environmental Impact Statement*, Program Manager for Chemical
5 Demilitarization.

6
7 2003 and 2007, *Anniston Chemical Agent Disposal Facility (ANCDF) Review and Evaluation of*
8 *Information for Updating the 1991 Final Environmental Impact Statement*

9
10 2001, *Final Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement, Transportable Treatment Systems*
11 *for Non-stockpile Chemical Warfare Material.*

12
13 2004, Brockington and Associates, *Intensive Architectural Survey for Anniston Army Depot.*

14
15 March 30, 2009, Conversation with Chad Bassinger, ANAD Natural Resource Specialist.

16
17 March 3, 2009, Conversation with John Harsch, ANCA.

18
19 Jan 22, 2007, *Integrated Natural Resource Management Plan for ANAD*

20
21 Information on the various EDTs obtained from open sources.

22
23 Anniston Army Depot RCRA Permit, EPA ID# AL3 210 020 027, Date of Issuance: November
24 14, 2007 by the Alabama Department of Environmental Management, and Modified on March
25 24, 2008 and September 19, 2008.

1
2
3

TABLE 1: DESCRIPTION OF MUSTARD-FILLED CHEMICAL AGENT MUNITIONS

Munitions	Model/ Agent	Dimensions		Total Mass (lb)	Fill		Burster		Propellant			Other Energetic Components	
		Diameter	Length (in)		Agent	Mass (lb)	Model	Explosive	Mass (lb)	Model	Mass (lb)		Fuze Model
105-mm Cartridge	M60	105 mm	31.1	42.92	HD	2.97	M5	Tetrytol	0.3	M67	2.83	M557	M28A2/M28B2 Primer
4.2-inch cartridges/ mortars	M2	105 mm	31.1	42.92	HD	2.97	M5	Tetrytol	0.3	M67	2.83	M51A5	M22 Booster
	M2A1	4.2 in.	21.0	24.67	HT	5.8	M14	Tetryl	0.14	M6	0.4	M8	M2 Primer
155-mm Projectile	M110	4.2 in.	21.0	24.67	HD	6.0	M14	Tetryl	0.14	M6	0.4	M8	M2 Primer
		155 mm	26.8	94.59	HD	11.7	M6	Tetrytol	0.41	--	--	--	--

TABLE 2: CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS AND COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES TO BE TREATED IN AN EDT

DODAC	Nomenclature	Quantity on Hand	NEW per Item (lb)	Quantity-Distance
1315-C244	Ignition Cartridge	201,935	0.0240	1.4G
1315-C751	Burster, Proj M53/Mf3A1 f/105MM WP Ctg	1,089	0.2100	1.1D
1315-CX66	Initiator, Burster	33,740	0.015	(04)1.2D
1315-C245	Ctg, Ign M8 f/81MM	218,268	0.0176	1.4G
1315-C243	Ctg, Ign M6 f/81MM	676,154	0.0171	1.4G
1320-00-825-1469	Ejection Charge Assembly	7,635		1.1D
1325-F740	Fuze, Bomb Nose MK339 MOD 1	2	0.0006	1.4D
1325-F742	Fuze, Bomb, Nose FMU 107/B	5	0.0027	(04)1.2D
1325-F677	Fuze, Bomb, Nose & Tail AN-M173A1	274	0.0280	1.1B
1325-F829	Fuze, Bomb Nose M147A1	114	0.0027	1.4D
1325-F870	Fuze, Bomb Nose AN-M166	70	0.0885	1.1B
1325-F724	Fuze, Bomb Tail M990E4	45	0.2710	1.1B
1325-F723	Fuze, Bomb Tail M990E3	174	0.2710	1.1B
1325-G104	Fuze, Bomb Tail MD376 MOD 0	178	0.02722	1.1D
1325-376	Extension, Fuze Bomb, M1 Series	174	2.0	1.1D
1325-G210	Igniter, Bomb, MK273, MOD 0	214	0.858	1.3G
1325-F716	Fuze, Bomb Nose/Tail, M907E2	100	0.015	(04)1.2.2D
1325-F390	Adapter, Booster Bomb Tail M150	2,101	0.904	1.1D
1325-F835	Fuze	73	0.163	1.1D
1325-F382	Adapter Booster Bomb T46E3/E5	2,646	0.88	1.1D
1325-F744	Fuze, Proximity FMU56D/B	13,608	0.0008	1.4D
1325-F736	Fuze Bomb Nose MK374 MOD 1	30	0.032	(04)1.2.2D
1325-F738	Fuze Bomb Nose FMU81/B	23	0.0007	1.4D
1325-F504	Booster, Aux, Bomb	659	0.01	1.3C
1325-F372	Adapter, Booster T45E7	1,553	0.3900	1.4D
1325-F381	Adapter, Booster Bomb Tail T46E1	60	0.9040	1.1D
1325-G374	Axtension, Bomb Fuze	145	1.0	1.1D
1325-F553	charge, Spotting, MA-1	821	6	1.1D
1325-G216	Delay Element, Fuze Bomb, M9, 10 Sec Delay	8,921	0.0002	1.4S
1325-G212	Delay Element, Fuze Bomb, M9, Non Delay	4,357	0.0002	1.4S
1325-G213	Delay Element, Fuze Bomb, M9, 01 Sec Delay	2,918	0.0002	1.4S
1325-G217	Delay Element, Fuze Bomb, M9, 25 Sec Delay	20	0.0002	1.4S
1325-F841	Fuze, Bomb Tail, FMU-54 A/B	1	0.36	(04)1.2.2D
1325-F739	Fuze, Bomb, Nose, M904E4	52	0.1652	1.1D
1325-989	Fuze, Bomb, Tail, M905	2	0.015	(04)1.2.2D
1325-F835	Fuze, Bomb, Nose, M904E2/E3	73	0.165	1.1D
1325-F688	Fuze, Bomb, Nose/Tail, FMU26A/B	15	0.0007	1.4D
1325-F837	Fuze, Bomb, Tail, MK344, MOD 0	14	0.0400	1.1D
1325-F680	Fuze, Bomb, Nose, M904E2	10	0.1652	1.1D
1325-F681	Fuze, Bomb, Nose, M904E2	8	0.1652	1.1D
1325-F372	Adapter, Booster, T45E7	1,553	0.39	1.1D
1325-F382	Adapter, Booster, Bomb T46E3/E5	2,646	0.88	1.1D
1325-F716	Fuze, Bomb, Nose/Tail, M907E2	100	0.015	(04)1.2.2D
1325-F679	Fuze, Bomb, Tail M990E1	304	0.271	1.1D
1325-F387	Adapter, Booster Bomb M147	50	0.88	1.1D
1325-F845	Fuze, Bomb Side M918	525	0.0153	1.1B
1325-G109	Fuze, Bomb, Tail MK346	1,864	0.0007	1.4D
1325-F746	Fuze, Prox, FMU113/BW/O Booster	1	0.002	1.4S
1330-G877	Fuze, Hand Grenade M213	1,367	0.0032	1.4G

TABLE 2: CONVENTIONAL MUNITIONS AND COMPONENTS IDENTIFIED AS POSSIBLE CANDIDATES TO BE TREATED IN AN EDT

DODAC	Nomenclature	Quantity on Hand	NEW per Item (lb)	Quantity-Distance
1330-G874	Fuze, Hand Grenade M201A1	4,570	0.0032	1.4G
1330-G873	Fuze, Hand Grenade M10A3/M204	8,107	0.0071	1.1B
1336-V264	S&A, Guided Missile	54	0.2	1.4D
1336-V021	S&A, TOW	67,739	0.1	1.4D
1337-V837	Igniter Assembly	3	0.375	(04)1.2.2G
1340-H405	Igniter, Rocket Motor, MK 15666-0,1	8	0.2071	(04)1.2.2G
1340-H414	Igniter, Rocket Motor, MK 188-0	732	0.2115	(04)1.2.2G
1340-J329	Fuze, Rocket, nose, M414/MK93	175	0.0245	(04)1.2.2D
1340-J350	Fuze, Rocket, Proximity, M429	4,176	0.0198	1.4B
1340-J3496	Fuze, Rocket, PD, M423	544	0.0203	1.1B
1345-K002	Activator, M1 F/AT Mine, Practice, M12A1	40,512	0.0044	0.4S
1345-K050	Fuze, M603 F/AT Mine, M15	1,246	0.073	1.4D.1.4G
1345-K040	Charge, Spotting, F/Mine AP Practice M8	60	0.0608	1.4G
1345-K030	Primer-Igniter, Mine Fuze, M39 f/M10 mine	980	0.0021	1.4G
1345-K051	Fuze, M604 f/AT Practice Mine, M10A1, M12, M20	332	0.375	1.4G
1345-K058	Fuze, M605 Comb. F/M16 Mine	3,457	0.0028	1.4D
1345-K885	Fuze, Smoke Pot, M208, Mech	103	0.0793	1.4G
1345-K887	Fuze, Smoke Pot, M207A1, Mech	7,901	0.0015	1.4G
1375-00-987-4964	Impact Fuze Section	298	4.8	1.1D
1377-M647	Impulse Ctg.	8	0.0027	1.4C
1377-M517	Ctg, Impulse, MK47, MOD 0	23	0.0446	1.4C
1377-M185	Ctg, Impulse, MK8, MOD 0	77	0.0438	1.4C
1344-M548	Ctg, Impulse, MK127, MOD 0	83	0.0009	1.4C
1377-M282	Ctg, Delay, MK4, MOD 2	285	0.0003	1.4S
1377-M284	Ctg, Delay MK5, MOD 1	1,493	0.0003	1.4S
1377-M934	Ignition Element, Electric	257	0.0007	1.4S
1377-M943	Ctg, Impulse MK107, MOD 0	457	0.0569	1.4C
1377-M657	Ctg, Impulse	8	0.0038	1.4S
1377-M258	Initiator, Ctg, Actuated Delay 0.4 Sec	45	0.0021	1.4S
1377-M783	Ctg, Impulse	26	0.016	1.4C
1377-M363	Ctg, Impulse, MK124, MOD 0	886	0.0189	1.4C
1377-M571	Ctg, Impulse, Gas Generator	2,966	0.0773	1.4C
1377-M948	Ctg, Impulse	62	0.0013	1.4C
1377-MC54	Ctg, Impulse	21	1.0	1.4C
1377-M232	Ctg, A/C/Fire Extinguisher	12	0.0009	1.4S
1390-N411	Fuze, Proximity, M514	18,421	0.0559	(04)1.2.2D
1390-N477	Fuze, Proximity, M514	18,131	0.0554	(04)1.2.2D

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DoDAC = DoD Ammunition Code




Figure 2: 4.2-inch Mortar

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	M2A1	M2
Length	21 in	21 IN
Diameter	4.2 in	4.2 in
Total weight	25 lb	25 lb
Agent	HD	HT
Agent weight	6.0 lb	5.8 lb
Burster	M8	M8
Explosive	Tetryl	Tetryl
Explosive weight	0.14 lb	0.14 lb




Figure 3: 105mm Projectile

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	M60 Cartridge
Length	31.1 in
Diameter	105mm
Total weight	42.9 lb
Agent	HD
Agent weight	3.0 lb
Burster	M5
Explosive	Tetrytol
Explosive weight	0.26 lb

6




Figure 4: 155mm Projectile

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	M110
Length	26.8 in
Diameter	155mm
Total weight	94.6 lb
Agent	HD
Agent weight	11.7 lb
Burster	M6
Explosive	Tetrytol
Explosive weight	0.41 lb

6




Figure 5: Diagram of the CDC unit

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


Figure 6: DAVINCH System

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


Figure 7: Major components of the Explosive Destruction System




Figure 8: Cross section of the SDC

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


Figure 9: Location of Anniston Army Depot